Recently it was conjectured that an ElGamal-based public-key encryption scheme with stateful decryption resists lunch-time chosen ciphertext and leakage attacks in the only computation leaks information model.
Introduction
Leakage-resilient cryptography [1, 2] is a recent research line that aims at building countermeasures and/or defences against side-channel attacks while providing security reductions in a provable security manner. The methodology is as follows: an abstract model specifying the leakage data is chosen and the goal is to exhibit a reduction from a hardness assumption to a hypothetical side-channel adversary. The theory of leakageresilient cryptography has witnessed a tremendous activity despite its short life. However, meeting the strongest security levels (resiliency against continual leakage attacks [3] ) under the weakest assumptions (memory leakage [3] /auxiliary input [4] ) is still out of reach from a practical point of view. To our knowledge existing schemes are inecient when compared to their counterparts in the non-leakage setting; moreover, current leakage-resilient constructions are conceptually far more complex than those a practitioner currently nds in its cryptographic tool-box.
In this sense it is worth to mention the work by Kiltz and Pietrzak [5] . They propose BEG a pairingbased analogue of the ElGamal encryption scheme [6] with stateful decryption which is leakage-resilient against lunch-time chosen ciphertext and leakage attacks (CCLA1). The latter means that the classical distinguishing adversary against ElGamal is given access to decryption and leakage oracles only before the challenge ciphertext is given. The basic idea is to set the ElGamal secret key to be a group element (in contrast to an integer), and then multiplicatively share it. While splitting the secret key before decryption is a well-known technique, the novelty of this work is to propose to split a group element rather than an integer. It is shown that if the secret key length is κ, then the BEG scheme is secure against leakage of at most λ κ 2 bits at every decryption step. More precisely, λ < κ 2 − ω (log κ) to make it infeasible to guess the remaining bits of the secret key by a brute force attack. Their proof uses the so-called Generic Bilinear Group Model [7] .
The authors of [5] discuss the limitations of getting a security proof for a similar leakage-resilient property of ElGamal with stateful decryption over arbitrary groups. Nevertheless they conjecture that, for certain arbitrary groups where the Decisional Die-Hellman problem is hard, ElGamal with stateful decryption, that they call EG , might be resistant against side-channel attacks that abide by the Continual Leakage Split-State model.
Our Contribution In this work we impose a limit on the conjecture from [5] , by proving that if a minimum of 3 8 + o (1) κ bits are leaked at every invocation of the secret key, a CCLA1 attack exists against ElGamal with stateful decryption scheme EG that recovers the secret key. Interestingly, our limit to the conjecture applies to any arbitrary instantiation of the underlying group. To achieve this result we dene a new problem, called Hidden Shares -Hidden Number Problem, which is a close but new variant of the Hidden Number Problem [8] .
Open Problem As far as we know, no (stateful) ElGamal-based public-key encryption scheme with constant public-key size exists in the literature oering (provable) resistance against continual leakage attacks (in the standard model). Finding such a scheme remains a challenging open question.
Known Hidden Number Problems
The Hidden Number Problem (HNP) was originally introduced by Boneh and Venkatesan [8] to demonstrate the hardness of computing the most signicant bits of the secret key in the Die-Hellman key exchange mechanism. In its most generic form it can be described as follows. Let f α : D → V, α ∈ A be a family of maps between algebraic domains D and V. The map is parametrized by α, that takes values from some set A.
Denition 1.
[Generic HNP [9] ] Suppose some partial information about f α (t) ∈ V is given for several values of t, chosen uniform randomly from a subset T ⊆ D, nd α.
Typically, D and V are nite elds F p . An instance of the Generic HNP problem is the Modular Inversion Hidden Number Problem (MIHNP) [10] , also called F p -Inverse-HNP [9] . In MIHNP, we have
where MSB k,p (z) means the (integer representing the) k most signicant bits of z (mod p), and the elements of F p are identied with integers of xed bit-length log 2 p + 1. In other words, we are given n + 1 pairs ( t i , MSB k,p (1/( α + t i )) ), for i = 0, . . . , n, where t i ∈ F p \ {−α} are chosen uniform randomly and independently, and the goal is to nd a polynomial-time (in log p) algorithm to recover α ∈ F p completely. The hardness of variants of this problem has been used to construct ecient algebraic PRNGs and MACs [10] . A close variant of MIHNP is one where
Another problem related to the HNP was addressed in [11] and it is called the HNP with hidden multipliers (HM-HNP). In [9] , the same problem is referred to as F p -Approx-HNP.
Denition 2.
[HM-HNP [11, 12, 13] 
To our knowledge the HS-HNP has not been explicitly addressed before. Note that unlike the Generic HNP, in HS-HNP (also HM-HNP) only a partial information about the values t i is given. The name hidden shares follows from the fact that t i and α ti (mod p) are two multiplicative shares of α ∈ F p .
We stress that in spite of similarities in the techniques used to solve various variants of HNP, there are signicant dierences in the technical details. FoThese dierences eventually reect in the amount of partial information (value of k) required to solve the problem with a reasonable success probability. For comparison, the values of k required for HNP, MIHNP, and HM-HNP are √ log p+log log p, 
The Conjecture
We denote the eld of prime order p by F p . The eld F p is identied with Z p , and we use them interchangeably. By MSB k,p (z), we mean the (integer representing the) k most signicant bits of z (mod p), where the elements of Z p are represented by integers of xed bit-length m = log p + 1. For instance, MSB 2,7 (3) = 1. The notation log always refers to logarithm to the base 2. 
KEM and the leakage model
Formally, KEM consists of three algorithms KG, Enc and Dec. The key generation algorithm KG on input a security parameter κ produces a pair of public and secret keys (pk, sk). The encapsulation algorithm Enc, taking only pk as input, outputs an encryption C of a key K. The decapsulation algorithm Dec on inputs sk and C outputs K. The goal of an adversary is to distinguish the encryption of a given key from that of a random key. An adversary may be a Chosen Plaintext Attack-(CPA-) adversary if it has no access to a decryption oracle. If it does have access to such an oracle then it is called a Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) adversary. CCA adversaries can be further classied into CCA1-or CCA2-adversaries. A CCA1-adversary cannot query the decapsulation oracle after obtaining the challenge ciphertext.
In a KEM with stateful decapsulation, KEM = (KG, Enc, Dec1, Dec2), the decapsulation algorithm Dec is split into two parts Dec1 and Dec2 executed consecutively. Each such algorithm uses dierent parts of the memory that therefore leak independent side-channel data, thus obeying to the Only Computation Leaks/Split-State model [1, 14] . The secret key of KEM now consists of two parts sk i = (σ i , σ i ), each part residing on a dierent portion of the memory. Dec1 can access σ i , while Dec2 has access only to σ i . The decapsulation procedures may update the secret key sk i to sk i+1 = σ i+1 , σ i+1 after each access to it. We refer to one execution of the decapsulation query as a round.
The leakage in each round is modelled as the output of two adversarially chosen eciently computable functions f i (·) and g i (·) whose output length is bounded by λ bits each; λ is the leakage parameter. The function f i (σ i−1 , r i ) models the leakage produced when computing with σ i−1 and the internal randomness r i used by Dec1. The function g i (σ i−1 , w i , r i ) models the leakage wrt. σ i−1 , the internal randomness r i used by Dec2, and the information w i shared between Dec1 and Dec2. The KEM is said to be (κ, λ) secure under the Chosen Ciphertext with Leakage Attacks 1 (CCLA1) if the scheme remains secure even when an adversary can obtain λ bits of leakage from each of the two functions f i and g i , at every decapsulation query.
Stateful ElGamal KEM. Let the output of Gen(κ, λ) be a cyclic group G = g of prime order p, generated by g. Let EG = (KG EG , Enc EG , Dec1 EG , Dec2 EG ) be the stateful KEM dened in Section 3.1 in [15] as follows:
0 (mod p). The public key is pk = (G, g, p, h), and the secret key is sk = (σ 0 , σ 0 ).
Claim [5, Conjecture 1] EG is CCLA1 secure if p − 1 has a large prime factor.
The above statement is incomplete if the leakage parameter λ (i.e., the amount of leakage from each of Dec1 EG and Dec2 EG ) is not specied. For instance, the conjecture could hold for λ log p 2
. More precisely, λ < log p 2 − ω (log log p) to make it infeasible to guess the remaining bits by a brute force attack. Since leakage is modelled by functions f i (σ i−1 , r i ) and g i σ i−1 , (r i , K i ) , it is easy see that if λ > log p/2, then one can completely recover r i in the i th round and also some bits of the initial state (σ 0 , σ 0 ). In at most 2 log p rounds, the secret key x can be fully recovered. This is the trivial attack.
Relationship to the HS-HNP. In the following we argue that it is possible to obtain 2λ most signicant bits of each of the two shares of the secret key in EG . This is a consequence of the fact that λ bits of σ i (respectively, σ i ) can be leaked from each of f i (σ i−1 , r i ) and f i+1 (σ i , r i+1 ) (respectively, g i σ i−1 , (r i , K i ) and g i+1 σ i , r i+1 , K i+1 ), where i ≥ 1. After 2n + 2 rounds of execution of (Dec1 EG , Dec2 EG ), an adversary will be able to obtain n + 1 pairs MSB 2λ,p (σ 2i+1 ) , MSB 2λ,p σ 2i+1 of the secret key, where i = 0, . . . , n.
The above observation leads us to an instance of HS-HNP (Denition 3) with α = x, t i = σ 2i+1 and α ti ≡ σ 2i+1 (mod p), where i = 0, . . . , n. Note that t i is uniform random and independent in Z * p . Hence investigating HS-HNP is a natural approach to resolve the above conjecture. This is the topic of the next section.
Let us notice that in [15] it is wrongly stated that breaking the CCLA1 security of the stateful ElGamal KEM is related to the Hidden Multipliers -HNP (Denition 2). That is, using our notation, the HM-HNP boils down to an adversary that is getting leakage on t i and αt i , which corresponds to t i = σ 2i+1 and αt i ≡ σ 2i+1 t 2 i (mod p), where i = 0, . . . , n. Apparently, the value αt i is never computed in the ElGamal KEM nor can possibly be computed by leakage functions.
Hidden Shares -Hidden Number Problem
Let p be an m-bit integer. We have m = log p + 1.
. . , n. Note that the integers y i and b i are known, while the integers δ i and i are unknown. We have
Since α is an unbounded variable, we will eliminate it from the n + 1 equations represented by (1). We obtain
On rearranging the terms, we obtain a set of n equations (for i = 1, . . . , n) as
For the sake of clarity, let us denote the coecients in the above i th relation by
respectively in the order. Equation (2) can now be rewritten as
Note again that the only unknowns in the above equation are δ 0 , δ i , 0 and i . Equation (3) can be rewritten over the integers as
where the µ i are unknowns, and i = 1, . . . , n. The quantities µ i are of little interest compared to that of δ i and i . We shall now construct a lattice that captures the relations dened by (4). Since (4) contains non-linear terms like δ 0 0 and δ i i , we linearize the relation by treating the non-linear terms as a separate variable. It is also desirable to have the solution we are looking for correspond to a short vector in the lattice. Our construction is similar to the one in [10, Section 3.1].
Setting up the lattice
The lattice we construct has dimension 4n + 4 and it is represented by a (4n + 4) × (4n + 4) matrix M consisting of rational entries. The lattice is generated as the row span of the matrix M . The structure of M is as follows:
where J and P are diagonal matrices having dimensions (3n + 4) × (3n + 4) and n × n, respectively. Matrix R has dimensions (3n + 4) × n. The rows of M correspond to the terms present in the n relations represented 
by (4). The rst row is associated with the constant term, the next n + 1 rows correspond to the variables δ i , next n + 1 rows with i , while the further n + 1 rows correspond to δ i i . The last n rows are associated with the terms µ i . Each of the last n columns of M correspond to a relation in (4), while the rst 3n + 4 columns are associated with the inverse of an upper bound on the size of the quantities 1, δ i , i and δ i i (in the solution we are interested in). In what follows, we give a complete description of the matrix M . Let P [i , j ] denote the entry in the i th row and the j th column of the matrix P . The matrix P has p on all of its main diagonal, i.e. P [i, i] = p for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The i th row of P corresponds to the term µ i in (4).
2(k−m) for 2n + 4 ≤ i ≤ 3n + 4 (for terms δ i i ). As we shall later see, these entries of J are required to bound the norm of the vector corresponding to our solution. Each of the n relations of (4) is described in matrix R (excluding terms p · µ i , which are described by matrix P ). The entry R [i , j ] is the coecient of the term corresponding to row i in the j th relation. Hence the columns of matrices R and P together completely describe the system of equations (4).
As an illustration, the matrix M is described for the case n = 2 in Figure 1 , where φ = 2 k−m . The terms corresponding to the 12 rows of M are (from top to bottom) 1, δ 0 , δ 1 , δ 2 , 0 , 1 , 2 , δ 0 0 , δ 1 1 , δ 2 2 , µ 1 , and µ 2 , respectively. 
Note that the vector v · M has a leading 1, and n trailing zeros. Its length is 4n + 4 and its Euclidean norm
If we are able to nd the vector v · M , then we can readily recover the values d i , e i , and hence solve the system of (4). Since the vector v · M has a bounded length, we can try to choose a value for k such that the resulting lattice has a suciently large determinant, and hence is unlikely to have many vectors shorter than v · M 2 . Then we can run a lattice reduction algorithm, say LLL [16] , to obtain reduced basis vectors. We then hope that by exploiting the structure of the vector v · M , we can obtain it as a simple combination of a few short basis vectors. Since it appears hard to rigorously bound the probability of failure, we had to content ourselves with the heuristic arguments, as it is common with these techniques.
We now give an estimate for the suitable values of k. The Gaussian heuristic gives an estimate of the expected number of lattice points in a sphere of given volume. Consider a full rank lattice L in R n whose determinant is det(L ). Let V n (r ) denote the volume of an n -ball S n (r ) of radius r , centered at the origin. Lemma 4. [Gaussian Heuristic [17, pp. 28]] The expected number of lattice points of L in S n is
where Γ (·) is the Gamma function. In our case, the determinant of the lattice M in (5), det(M ), is
The above inequality follows from the fact that p is an m-bit integer. Note that the value of det(M ) increases with the value of k. By (7), v · M 2 < √ 3n + 4. We would like to choose such a value for k so that the expected number of lattice points of M in S 4n+4 ( √ 3n + 4) is at most one. By Lemma 4 and (9), it suces if
On rearranging the above inequality, we get
From (8), V 4n+4 (
Finally we can conclude that there is an ecient (heuristic) method to solve the HS-HNP problem with
On applying the above method to attack the scheme EG (c.f. Section 2.1), we obtain that the stateful KEM EG is not CCLA1 secure if the leakage parameter λ ≥ 3 8 + o (1) log p. We would like to note that our attack does not exploit any information about the elements of the underlying group G in EG .
Hence this attack will work for any instantiation of the group.
Implementation details
We have implemented the above method to solve HS-HNP in the PARI/GP computer algebra system [18] . The experiments were run on an Intel(R) Core i7-2600 CPU with 4 GB RAM, running cygwin (ix86/GMP-4.2.1 kernel) 32-bit version. The results are given in Table 1 . For every (n, m) pair, 10 random m-bit primes p were chosen. For each p, 10 random hidden numbers α were chosen. The running time reported is averaged over 100 (p, α) pairs for each row of the table. For lattice reduction, we have used the routine qflll in PARI/GP.
In the experiments, we have observed that there is one (reduced) basis vector of very low norm, of order 1 2 m−k . This is because the rows of the matrix M (Equation (5) We have also observed that there are many (reduced) basis vectors with norm of about √ 3n + 4. In order to overcome these issues, we randomize the relations from Equation (2) by multiplying each relation by a random independent element of Z * p . This will not alter the solution set and yet there will be very short vectors of the order 1 2 m−k . But the experiments suggest that there will be only one (reduced) basis vector (second shortest) of norm about √ 3n + 4, and we can get the required values of d i and e i from the corresponding entries of the basis vector. This heuristic has not failed even once for the 900 (p, α) pairs of Table 1 , provided k is chosen according to Equation (10). 
